

AAU CONFERENCE ON CONSERVATISM STUDIES
NEW CONSERVATISMS & NEW APPROACHES

ABSTRACTS

Erhan Akarcay

(Anadolu University, Eskisehir)

Saturday, Session 6

(10:00-12:00)

Turk-Islam Synthesis: A Conservatisation Project in Turkey

This paper is concerned with Turk-Islam synthesis which is considered as a conservatisation project. The paper particularly examines Turkish conservatism through a sociological and historical perspective in relation to Turk-Islam synthesis. Conservatism is one of the key concepts in understanding of the Turkish society which has always been also the crucial dynamics in social, cultural and political life in the historical process. Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism, as political and intellectual movements during the late Ottoman period, effected the intellectual heritage of conservatism in Turkey either ideologically or traditionally even in the transition process to the Turkish Republic. Furthermore conservatism is intrinsic to the society and has always been a force that could dominate and transform political domain in Turkey. Thereafter 1980 military intervention, Turk-Islam synthesis was articulated in state's official ideology in order to conservatise the society. Turk-Islam synthesis was religious-nationalist conservatist movement which was formed by rightist intellectuals. In this paper, the articulation process is evaluated as an ideological state apparatus which can be found in national education institutions and in secondary school textbooks. Apparently Turk-Islam synthesis functions as a conservatisation project.

Mehmet Akinci

(University of Aksaray, Aksaray),

Saturday, Session 7

(10:00-12:00)

Turkish Conservative Thought: A General Framework

The topic of this study is the tradition of conservative thought in Turkey. In order to provide a better understanding of conservatism within Turkish tradition of thought, Turkish conservative thought has been analysed within the period of 1946-1983. Turkish conservative thought has

been analysed over the works of five different authors (Peyami Safa, Ali Fuat Başgil, Osman Turan, Mümtaz Turhan ve Erol Güngör) who had effective roles in the period stated above. In the studies conducted about conservatism, the difficulty of finding a common definition of conservatism, on which there is a consensus, is already known. Therefore, it is thought that the conservative ideology which developed as an opposition to Enlightenment, French Revolution and factors causing a rapid change in the traditional structure of the society can provide a good basis in understanding Turkish conservative thought. The starting point of the study is the assumption that Turkish conservative thought has developed as an opposition to Kemalist modernization, which was influenced by the Enlightenment and had a positivist epistemology, and as an opposition to its social, engineering projects.

A quick glance at the literature puts forward that there is a deep philosophical basis behind conservative thought known for its being against change. This basis explains the attitude of conservativists against change. The fact that conservativists – no matter whether they are theologic or secular based - consider human as a restricted being and therefore they give a restricted role to human mind provides us the first signs of how they see change. This emphasis on the limits of mind in the conservative thought does not stem from an opposition to rationality. Besides the knowledge produced based on rationality, they also give importance to knowledge produced based on experience. Therefore, the concept of tradition which is seen as a source of knowledge is considered quite significant in the conservative thought. What is summarized up to now is the background of how conservative thought sees change. This background is a short summary of Mannheim's framework in which "traditionalism" is distinguished from modern conservatism and the conservatism is defined as "conscious traditionalism."

The basic purpose of the study is to determine whether the opinions of authors/thinkers who stood out in Turkish conservative thought form a consistent whole within this ideological framework. In other words, the study aimed at understanding whether the thoughts of the thinkers handled within the framework of this study and lived in the period stated above were "conscious traditionalism" in order to qualify them as conservativist. In conclusion, considering the fears put forward by the thinkers (their fears were caused by their opposition to social engineering projects and by the idea that the social structure would corrupt due to the speed of the change) in their criticisms of the epistemology on which the idea of modernization dominant in Turkey was based, the present study investigates the idea that there was a conservative thought tradition in Turkey in the period handled in the study.

Stefan Andreasson

(Queen's University Belfast, Belfast)

Friday, Session 3

(13:00-15:00)

Conservatism and Postcolonial Politics

This paper constitutes a conservative re-reading of the postcolonial politics literature. It identifies a cognitive dissonance between theoretical aspirations and historical and social realities that currently maligns postcolonial politics and outlines the radical and oftentimes utopian politics it generates. The paper explains how conservatism provides a way out of the theoretical and political *cul-de-sac* in which the postcolonial project has become trapped by relating a conservative perspective on postcolonialism to current developments in research on indigeneity and post-development theory. These are important and contested fields of study from within which a re-conceptualisation of postcolonial politics is possible as important contributions in each field rest on genuinely conservative grounds, even if seldom recognised as such. The paper further attempts to resolve inherent ambiguities in the concept of postcoloniality as conventionally employed, such as the tension between empirical particularity in exhortations to 'the local' and theoretical universality in teleological development and emancipation 'projects'. It does so by arguing that postcolonialism must be reclaimed from the ephemeral heights of postmodern and poststructural theorising, and from the progressivism of liberalism and socialism, to instead emphasise the importance of historical context, tradition and continuity in empirical analysis of colonialism and its aftermath.

Zoltan Balazs

(Corvinus University, Budapest)

Friday, Session 5

(15:15-17:55)

The Authority of Morality Over Politics – Carving Out The Conservative Position

As a first approach, it may be said that in the field of ethics left-liberalism finds its strongest ally in Kantian deontology, right-liberalism in utilitarianism, and republicanism in virtue ethics. There does not seem to be a similar preference of conservatism for any particular ethical theory. One reason for this difference might be that conservatism is not structured as liberalism and republicanism are, it is a different 'thing.' I want to argue for another possible reason, namely, that conservatism tends to constrain the authority of ethics over politics in general. The point is not, however, that politics is or ought to be 'a-moralized', as has been claimed by Raymond

Geuss recently. Rather, it is that in politics, understood as a social-institutional network, several authorities compete, including that of morality, and possibly even that of politics. Each has fundamental and valid claims to be obeyed. What distinguishes the conservative approach to politics from, say, the liberal one, is, put in somewhat paradoxical terms, that whereas liberalism sees or wishes to see politics as guided by some kind of a moral authority, though never calling it an *authority*, conservatism claims that authority is indispensable, but that it is fundamentally pluralistic.

Karen Celis

(University College Ghent, Ghent)

Friday, Session 1

(10:00-12:00)

Women, Feminists and the Left: Critical Actors in the Substantive Representation of Women? A cross-National Study of MPs and the Substantive Representation of Women

A rather solid overall-conclusion in empirical research regarding the substantive representation is that women, feminist and leftist parties are more fervent in representing women and their interests as compared to men, non-feminist and conservative parties (e.g. Phillips 1995; Tremblay & Pelletier 2000; Wängnerud 2005; Lovenduski & Norris 1993). However simple and intuitively correct this thesis may seem at first glance, combining these categories poses many questions about the group that can be seen as the ‘critical actors’ in the substantive representation of women (Childs & Krook 2009). Shouldn’t we be looking at gender instead of sex (Childs 2006)? Aren’t (self-declared) feminists (Tremblay & Pelletier 2000) and ‘preferable descriptive representatives’ (Dovi 2002: 729) that have ‘strong mutual relations with the dispossessed groups of historically disadvantaged groups’ – both categories include women and men- more likely to be engaged in the substantive representation of women than ‘women MPs’? Do we find these women MPs, feminists and preferable descriptive representatives eager to represent women only in leftist parties, or also to some extent in conservative and right wing parties (Lovenduski & Norris 2003; Norris 1996)?

This paper analyses new data on legislators’ attitudes and behaviour from the PARTIREP cross-national survey of over 65 national and regional parliaments in Europe. First, we comparatively analyse to what extent the categories ‘women’, ‘feminist’ and/or ‘preferable descriptive representative’ map onto the intentions of the MP to represent women. Secondly, we evaluate to what extent these ‘critical actors’ are present within left wing and right wing parties. The comparative study gives us the opportunity to take into account a variety of right wing parties (laissez-faire liberal, social conservative and populist parties) and left wing parties (traditional labour parties and the new ‘progressive’ left). We also consider whether or not a ‘conservative feminism’ exists in Europe (Dillard 2005).

Agnés Alexandre-Collier

(University of Burgundy, Dijon)

Friday, Session 2

(10:00-12:00)

Nicolas Sarkozy and the reinvention of the Bonapartist tradition

While French Gaullism originally claimed to be a trans-party movement bringing the whole country together in order to promote France's national grandeur, it gradually changed, under Jacques Chirac's influence, into a Conservative Party in the traditional sense of the term, completing its conversion to economic liberalism and European integration. With reference to René Rémond's seminal work on *The Right Wing in France*, this paper will attempt to show how the Gaullist movement, from the RPR in the 1970s to the present-day UMP, has switched from its attempted incursion into the Orleanist tradition to the rebirth of a Bonapartist tradition. While "Sarkozysm" now appears to be a syncretism combining liberal and republican ideals with an authoritarian and nationalist vision of France, it is also a clear strategy to attract voters on all sides of the political spectrum, from the left to the far-right. This syncretism can be considered as a tendency present in most Conservative parties in Europe, whose aim is to occupy the centre-ground through ideological modernisation opening the way to the inclusion of minorities, the promotion of post-materialistic values and the use of what Anthony Giddens called "life politics". As regards Sarkozy's UMP, however, it is also an attempt to get back to the roots of the Bonapartist tradition, to the time when the original Gaullist movement was dominated by a charismatic leader, state centralisation and national grandeur.

Rastislav Dinic

(Central European University, Budapest)

Saturday, Session 6

(10:00-12:00)

Contemporary Serbian Conservatism: Between Incoherence and Apologetic Tendencies

In my paper I will analyze the recent work of the most prominent conservative theoretician in Serbia, Misa Djurkovic, in hope of finding a coherent theoretical statement of contemporary Serbian conservatism. Djurkovic's significance as an opinion-maker and a public intellectual is reflected in the fact that besides being a political theorist and a prolific publicist, he also used to be an advisor to the former Serbian prime minister Vojislav Kostunica, and is a founder of the think-tank "Center for Conservative Studies".

In this paper I will primarily concentrate on his study "Conservatism and Conservative Parties", and several of his other articles written for scientific journals in Serbia, in which he is trying to prove that conservatism is the only ideology that can build strong liberal-democratic institutions in transitional Serbia. Drawing on the work of Michael Freeden, Jurgen Habermas, Alasdair Macintyre and Ted Honderich, I intend to show that Djurkovic's work is seriously

methodologically flawed and suffers from many typical contradictions that plague conservative thought as in general. More specifically, however, I will show that there is a deep incoherence at the very heart of Djurkovic's project, stemming from particularly Serbian conditions, which renders this project self-defeating and theoretically barren.

However, I proceed to show that, despite all its theoretical faults, it would be too quick to conclude that Djurkovic's conservatism is also politically barren. Turning to his other work, I will show that it plays an important role in aestheticizing and romanticizing the recent past, especially regarding the role of Serbian state in the recent wars, and its responsibility for war crimes. In this role, new Serbian conservatism is influential, but fiercely anti-liberal and seriously morally problematic.

Peter Dorey

(Cardiff University, Cardiff)

Friday, Session 2

(10:00-12:00)

A Conservative 'Third Way'?: British Conservatives and the Development of Post-Thatcherite Conservatism

Since the enforced resignation of Margaret Thatcher in November 1990, Britain's Conservative Party has struggled to devise a clear, coherent and consistent philosophy and political strategy. Only during the last few years does it finally seem to have developed a new, innovative and potentially popular mode of Conservatism for the early 21st Century.

Derived, it seems, from critiques and prognoses advanced by senior Party figures such as Oliver Letwin, Iain Duncan Smith, and David Willetts, and academics such as Phillip Blond, this Conservative 'third way', variously referred to as 'Civic Conservatism' or 'Communitarian Conservatism', has become much more prominent under David Cameron's leadership of the Party since December 2005.

This new(er) approach expresses an un-Thatcherite concern about poverty, excessive inequality and socio-economic deprivation, and acknowledges that 'the market' alone is not enough, but rather than advocate a return to state intervention and higher taxes on the rich to facilitate direct wealth redistribution, it advocates a 'bottom up' approach to tackling social problems and mending 'Broken Britain', whereby community organisations, voluntary bodies and social enterprises play an active role – a revival of Edmund Burke's 'little platoons' for 21st Century Britain.

Gergely Egedy

(Corvinus University, Budapest)

Saturday, Session 6

(10:00-12:00)

The Conservatism of József Antall: The Hungarian Version of Patrician Conservatism

The development of political conservatism since the collapse of communism has displayed a number of peculiar features in East-Central Europe. In Hungary the relative weakness of conservatism in the period of the change of the system cannot be separated from the contradiction inherent in its position. After the fall of the communist regime in 1989 conservatives were confronted with a dramatic challenge. They either opted for the „un-conservative” radical stance, with the intention of completely transforming the status quo which had come to be defended by the post-communist left, or they kept to the time-honoured traditions of conservatism and accepted the inherited distribution of power.

It was in this paradoxical situation that the Hungarian Democratic Forum under the leadership of the first freely elected Prime Minister, József Antall embraced conservatism. The lecture plans to analyze the character and the defining features of the type of conservatism adopted by Antall and his government (1990-1994) – this conservatism is described by the author as „patrician” conservatism. The lecture starts from the assumption that the „patrician” variant differs significantly from the later version of Hungarian conservatism, „mobilizing” conservatism embraced by Viktor Orbán and the FIDESZ.

Silvia Erzeel

(Free University of Brussels, Brussels)

Friday, Session 1

(10:00-12:00)

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Bulent Evre

(Near East University, Nicosia)

Friday, Session 3

(13:00-15:00)

Cyprus Issue and the Conservative Attitudes of the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots

In examining Cyprus issue in terms of internal dynamics, a variety of factors have been taken into consideration while nearly no attention has been paid to the role of conservatism in the problem. This paper aims at analyzing Cyprus issue in terms of conservatism as a habit of mind or a mode of feeling in order to underline and understand the difficulties in the process of solving the issue. Conservatism has acquired different meanings over time and across the countries. It can be divided into two forms in the context of Cyprus: institutional conservatism and cultural conservatism. Whereas the former supports the preservation of the established institutions, the latter tends to preserve the heritage of Cypriot culture. Such a distinction can be said to correspond more or less to the political spectrum in both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities. That is to say that institutional conservatism corresponds rather to the right wing, while cultural conservatism is shared more among the leftists, in both communities. Although very few people identify themselves as "conservative", conservative habit of mind is salient in both communities, and among both left and right wingers. In the process of the settlement of Cyprus issue, cultural conservatism may provide ground for a political partnership between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots while institutional conservatism at the symbolic level makes Cyprus issue difficult to solve.

Matthew Francis

(University of Nottingham, Nottingham)

Friday, Session 2

(10:00-12:00)

'A Crusade To Enfranchise The Many': Thatcher and the 'Property-Owning Democracy'

The concept of the 'property-owning democracy' has been one of the ideological and rhetorical constants of twentieth-century Conservatism. Coined by Noel Skelton in 1923, and the concept formed part of his proposed response to the rise of the Labour Party – but was revived by Anthony Eden in 1946, Margaret Thatcher in the 1970s, and more recently by the 'Red Tory' Phillip Blond.

But although the concept has remained a constant, its meaning has transformed as generations of Conservatives have reinterpreted and redefined the concepts that comprise it. As the Conservative understandings of 'property' and 'democracy' have changed over the course of the twentieth century, so too has the meaning of the 'property-owning democracy' changed and shifted.

One of the most significant of these shifts occurred under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher in the 1970s. The growing influence of economic liberalism in the party led to subtle shifts in the Conservative understanding of 'property' and 'democracy', which in turn led to a redefinition of the 'property-owning democracy' and a radical extension of the political objectives which it was perceived to meet. This paper will examine how the meaning of the 'property-owning democracy' was transformed under Thatcher's leadership, and examine the extent to which Conservatives were successful in its creation.

Nani Gelovani

(Tbilisi State University, Tbilisi)

Saturday, Session 7

(10:00-12:00)

The 'Conservative Revolution' in Saudi Arabia

The conservative tradition in European practice means 'the radical extension of democracy'. As for the Arab political practice, it practically, knows no phenomenon of democracy of a Western model. European Conservatism originated spontaneously, as the reaction to the Age of Enlightenment and French Revolution and was not of a thorough nature. As for the Conservatism in the Arab world, it turned into the means of political action as soon it originated. The present work sees the so-called Arab Conservatism on the example of Saudi Arabia. In Saudi Arabia, Islam is not only a state religion, but also the principal law of the state defining the basics of the state and public-and-economic system, public administration system, rights and

obligations of the subordinates. Saudi kingdom, with its status of a modern state in respect of its resources and potential significantly falls back the western liberal values (western political institutions, civil society, independent press, etc.). On February 14 of 2009, there were decrees of Saudi king published concerning the reforms in the state structures (Consultative Assembly, Council of Ministers, national law system, etc.). However, these reformative transformations were assessed as the measure of the state's self-defense and were named 'The Conservative Revolution'. The work, based on the material published in Arab newspapers (Asharq Al-Awsat, Al-Hayat), considers the principal essence of these reforms and term 'Conservative Revolution', accordingly.

Alicja Gescinska

(University of Ghent, Ghent)

Friday, Session 5

(15:15-17:55)

Conservatism and a European Cultural Reconstruction: On the Significance of Max Scheler's and Nikolaj Berdjaev's Conservative *Kulturkritik*

Max Scheler and Nikolaj Berdjaev were among the most important continental philosophers of the 20th century, even though their works are not very well-known nowadays. They influenced many great thinkers and their ideas show a remarkable ability to resist the ravages of time. A great intellectual proximity between both thinkers resides in the conservative *Kulturkritik* they expressed with the greatest pathos, and it is this *Kulturkritik* which remains relevant in a postmodern world which, according to many, leads to its own cultural and moral downfall (e.g. Scruton).

In the first part of the paper I will outline the core of Scheler's and Berdjaev's conservative *Kulturkritik*. I will frame their thoughts and writings in a broader historical perspective, as Scheler's call for a cultural reconstruction of Europe (*Zum Ewigen im Menschen*) and Berdjaev's sharp critique on the loss of values and the moral crisis which is caused by the decline of culture (e.g. *The Fate of Man*) are deeply rooted in the specific historical circumstances of the interwar period.

But their thoughts exceed these historical circumstances due to their philosophical depth and moral significance. In the second part of the paper I shall therefore try to argue how the insights of both philosophers remain relevant, focussing on a) the problem of an ultraliberal negative concept of liberty, b) the importance of a cultural elite which sustains a higher culture and resists the "vulgar tastes of the crowd" (Berdjaev), and c) the idea of a transnational solidarity as not opposed to conservative ideology (as so often is assumed), but as one of its elementary materials. As such both philosophers are convinced advocates of a moral revitalisation (against the *Umsturz der Werte*) and a cultural reconstruction of Europe, which remains of the utmost importance in times in which nihilism, value relativism, and moral indifference are still

prominent in many parts of everyday life. A rediscovery of Scheler's and Berdjaev's writings can not only lead to a better understanding of conservative ideology, but also to a better comprehension of the moral implications of the contemporary cultural malaise.

Hilal Onur Ince

(University of Hacettepe, Ankara)

Saturday, Session 7

(10:00-12:00)

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The topic of this study is the tradition of conservative thought in Turkey. In order to provide a better understanding of conservatism within Turkish tradition of thought, Turkish conservative thought has been analysed within the period of 1946-1983. Turkish conservative thought has been analysed over the works of five different authors (Peyami Safa, Ali Fuat Başgil, Osman Turan, Mümtaz Turhan ve Erol Güngör) who had effective roles in the period stated above. In the studies conducted about conservatism, the difficulty of finding a common definition of conservatism, on which there is a consensus, is already known. Therefore, it is thought that the conservative ideology which developed as an opposition to Enlightenment, French Revolution and factors causing a rapid change in the traditional structure of the society can provide a good basis in understanding Turkish conservative thought. The starting point of the study is the assumption that Turkish conservative thought has developed as an opposition to Kemalist modernization, which was influenced by the Enlightenment and had a positivist epistemology, and as an opposition to its social, engineering projects.

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“conscious traditionalism” in order to qualify them as conservativist. In conclusion, considering the fears put forward by the thinkers (their fears were caused by their opposition to social engineering projects and by the idea that the social structure would corrupt due to the speed of the change) in their criticisms of the epistemology on which the idea of modernization dominant in Turkey was based, the present study investigates the idea that there was a conservative thought tradition in Turkey in the period handled in the study.

Muhamad Takiyuddin Ismail

(National University of Malaysia, Bangi Selangor)

Saturday, Session 7

(10:00-12:00)

Abdullah Badawi and Malaysian Politics After Mahathir

The discourse on the ideology of conservatism is arguably neglected in the discourse on Malaysian politics. The only exception to this could be found during the debate of "Asian Values" in the mid-1990s. Yet, the success of the Malaysian *ancien regime*, i.e. the National Front, in maintaining the existing political order since 1957 may signify the important role of conservatism in building a consensus and perpetuating this political framework. However, with the end of Mahathir's authoritarian leadership, his predecessor, Abdullah Badawi (2003-2009) implemented significant shifts in order to distance himself from the legacy of Mahathir. While not a complete transformation substantially, much of his reforms especially in the context of democratic governance received widespread credit even from critics. The opening of space and changes in the style of leadership not only widened the atmosphere of competition, it consequently also contributed to the second phase of 'New Politics' as was seen in the unprecedented result of 12th General Election in 2008. With the declaration of the new Prime Minister, Najib Razak that the era of 'government knows best' and 'excessive control' is over, this paper argues that political developments in the post-Mahathir era represent a regime shift from conservatism to neoconservatism.

Diogo Morais S. Xavier Madureira

(Catholic University of Portugal, Lisbon)

Friday, Session 1

(10:00-12:00)

Christian Personalism as a Relevant Alternative Today

The main objective of this presentation is to try a conciliation between freedom and virtue or between individual and political community derived from the theoretical solutions of the Christian personalism. By exploring Maritain's neo-tomist thesis I will try to answer both voluntarist contractualism and pluralist conservatism, denouncing their origins on modernity's political language which, by its turn, promotes contemporary tendencies of our societies to relativism – omnipresent target of this reflexion.

Starting from Leo Strauss' critique on *The Three Waves of Modernity*, I will try to develop the idea that modernity in a general way but more specifically, natural right's contractualist interpretation, has opened the doors to historicism and relativism's projection through our time. According to this perspective, and supporting myself on the theory of the Person and the Common Good that characterizes neo-tomist thinking, I will defend that liberal conservatism is also a modern product and, for that reason, its answer to those contemporary problems seems to be inconsistent and incomplete. Conservatism's reluctance in conceiving politics beyond the modern prism, where the respect for individual liberty (natural to contractualists, historic or traditional to conservatives) is set as the main criterion of a regime's quality, seems to be a concrete signal of that kind of semantic identity that modern political philosophy establishes between good or just and legitimate, i.e., the legitimate regime is good and just and vice-versa.

Thus, the starting question of this presentation could be posed as such: how can we fight modern contractualism's voluntarism – in my view responsible, at some extent, for contemporary relativism - without restricting ourselves to the romantic sublimation of historical traditions and social institutions as modern conservatism does, and simultaneously, without harming the compromise with individual freedom?

Levente Nagy

(University of Debrecen, Hungary)

Friday, Session 3

(13:00-15:00)

The meaning of a concept: (Neo)Conservatism

Political concepts are part of our daily speech, but we often abuse them, because of the lack of proper understanding of the terms. The primary task of political scientists is to analyze commonly used concepts in order to assist us in gaining a fuller understanding of the terms.

It seems to be necessary to study the different ways in which (as well as the different purposes for which) given concepts are used in the course of history. More and more political philosophers have recognized the fact that unhistorical use of concepts does not allow them to distance themselves from thinking in terms of contemporary paradigms, unquestioned conventions or even value judgments. The *conceptual history*, or the *history of concepts* therefore seems to be a proper method for a better understanding of concepts.

The term *neo-conservatism* is not an exception from this. Irvin Kristol asked in one of his works: „What exactly is *neo-conservatism*?” His immediate answer refers primarily to the historical task and political purpose of *neo-conservatism* as a movement to provide the intellectual foundation for the resurgence of American conservatism, in order to convert the Republican party “into a new kind of conservative politics suitable to governing modern democracy”.

Its historical task or political purpose would not tell us exactly the meaning of *neo-conservatism*, because as any other ideology, conservatism as well contains (explicitly or

implicitly) at least two elements: first, a set of values (ideas); second, the assertion that social reality calls for the implementation of these values. (This latter element relates in fact to the historical task or political purpose of *neo-conservatism*).

In order to find the meaning of *neo-conservatism*, it seems inevitable to trace back to the emergence and evolution of it, and search (at least to make an attempt) for a „core“ of *conservative ideology* (if there is any), for common values and attitudes of it, whether we examine the traditional or the new forms of the American or the European *conservatisms*.

In my work I focus primarily on influential writings of Reinhart Koselleck, John Plamenatz, John Kekes, Roger Scruton, and Irving Kristol.

Pontus Odmalm

(University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh)

Friday, Session 4

(13:00-15:00)

Immigration as a Source of Ideological Tension for the Swedish Centre-Right

The politics of immigration does, by and large, tend to focus on governments or non-parliamentary actors. Relatively less attention is paid to how political parties interact and compete over the issue. Centre-right parties are here in a particularly difficult position since they have to deal with two distinct challenges. On the one hand, they have to position themselves in relation to the radical right who sometimes, but not always, are after the same voters. On the other, centre-right parties most compete with the centre-left who sometimes, but not always, are seen as being more competent at handling the ‘immigration issue’.

Based on interviews with Swedish centre-right MP’s, this article argues that immigration creates tension between the centre-right’s market-liberal and moral-conservative factions. This tension poses a number of electoral challenges. On the one hand, it creates an opening for the Swedish radical right (the Sweden Democrats) to frame immigration as a cultural, rather than economic, threat. At the same time, centre-left parties will attempt to make immigration into a matter of ‘issue ownership’. These two challenges put the current Alliance coalition in a situation where they are forced to pay attention to immigration even though their policy strengths, and agenda priorities, lay elsewhere.

Dogancan Ozel

(Anglo-American University, Prague)

Friday, Session 3

(13:00-15:00)

Challenging the Conservative Exceptionalism

A post-structuralist reading of ideologies can be derived from the post-structuralist corpus. Post-structuralist critique of grand narratives challenges the modern obsession to reduce the social into closed and structured discourses; and in this line of thought, ideologies appear as an obvious example of this obsession. Through the conception of the relations between signified and signifier, or between the structure and the structured, post-structuralist critique of ideologies offers significant insights on ideologies and opens new possibilities for utilising the term ideology to comprehend the sphere of politics.

One important insight in this sense is the necessarily ideational formations of ideologies. Ideological discourses reflect socio-political phenomena in an ordered and 'domesticated' fashion. Ideologies are therefore categorically distinct from 'the real', and even the so-called descriptive aspects of any ideological narrative are actually normative interventions. That unfillable gap between ideology and the real perpetually separates the political prospects of ideologies from the field of 'the real'. Status-quo as it appears in a socio-political discourse does not and cannot totally correspond to the real. This reading conceptualises the practice of politics itself as a sum of transformative interventions and renders all ideologies as ideational, i.e. having a conception of an 'ideal point' and urging for politics/transformation toward that ideal.

This post-structuralist interpretation has its most striking consequences for the conservative ideology. If politics is necessarily transformative, then conservative politics turns out to be an oxymoron, provided that conservatism is a political view favouring the present against the absent. But I suggest to not to rush to reach that conclusion. Instead, I propose that conservative ideology acknowledges the transformativeness of politics and adapts itself to this transformativeness by formulating a conservative ideal serving to draw the political horizon of conservatism. I argue that it is possible to find many traces in the conservative corpus indicating that conservative discourse always regarded itself as an intervention, and defined the conservative ideal as the unifying principle of all these interventions.

Ana Paula Rosendo

(Catholic University of Portugal, Lisbon)

Friday, Session 1

(10:00-12:00)

Echoes from the Voice of Liberal Learning of Michael Oakeshott

This paper pretends to be a reflection in the importance of the concept of Liberal Learning, as it regards school as the place where people engage themselves to the "adventure of learning"; a

pilgrimage with no external goals except self-knowledge through “conversation”. It’s only indispensable equipment is the teachers, and its goals are the acquisition of a disposition by acquiring habits through mastery.

Inspired in M. Oakeshott’s main ideas, we will tent to characterize the contemporary “state of affairs” in education. Nowadays modern governments are substituting the traditional idea of education for the idea of socialization. Schools should become places where students learn how to perform in an industrial and commercial society. Traditionally this kind of apprenticeship was independent of the engagement being pursued in schools and universities. Oakeshott considers the substitution of the idea of education for that of socialization one of the most important events in modern history. He also thinks that governments are not interested in educating but on imposing a homogeneous socialization. The pursuit of this enterprise of substituting education for socialization appears to its makers as the concretization of the ideal of “social integration”. The paper proposal presented aims to be a contribution to profound a reflection that should take place on this subject.

Kasper Støvring

(University of Southern Denmark, Odense)

Friday, Session 5

(15:15-17:55)

The Cultural Prerequisites of Social Cohesion

The cultural prerequisites for the creation of social cohesion are examined with particular reference to Denmark, a nation that has been found to exhibit strong social cohesion. Culture is understood from a conservative perspective as a social order based on mainly informal norms. Of these, trust is vital in creating social cohesion. However, trust occurs only under specific conditions, and in this regard the Danish nation, understood as a cultural community, is of interest. There is in Denmark a strong civil society characterized by honesty, reliability, and mutuality, which historically is due to the existence of several civil movements. In contrast to the liberal idea that society can be integrated through policy initiatives, a conservative idea is proposed that social cohesion occurs precisely because of the existence of a certain culture. The different cultural elements that characterize a society with strong cohesion are investigated and an argument is presented as to how cohesion can be conserved.

SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES & SOCIAL SCIENCES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS & DIPLOMACY

INVITE YOU TO ATTEND A CONFERENCE OF CONSERVATISM STUDIES

NEW CONSERVATISMS AND NEW APPROACHES

MAY 14–15, 2010

Day One (May 14)

- 8:00–8:30 *Registration*
- 8:30–8:45 *Opening Speech* (room – 001)
 Alan Krautstengl, President of Anglo-American University
- 8:45–9:45 *Keynote Speech:* (room – 001)
 “Conservatism and Christian Democracy: Never the Twain Shall Meet”
 Bale, Tim (University of Sussex, Sussex)
- 9:45–10:00 *Coffee Break*
- 10:00–12:00 *Session 1 (Chair: Bill Miller)* (room – 022)
 “Women, Feminists and the Left: A Cross-National Study” Silvia Erzeel
 (Free University of Brussels, Brussels), Karen Celis (University College
 Ghent, Ghent)
 “Christian Personalism as a Relevant Alternative Today” Diogo Morais
 S. Xavier Madureira (Catholic University of Portugal, Lisbon)
 “Echoes from the Voice of Liberal Learning of Michael Oakeshott” Ana
 Paula Rosendo (Catholic University of Portugal, Lisbon)
- Session 2 (Chair: Tim Bale)* (room – 021)
 “Nikolas Sarkozy’s UMP: The Reinvention of the Bonapartist
 Tradition?” Agnès Alexandre-Collier (University of Burgundy, Dijon)
 “A Conservative ‘Third Way’?: British Conservatives and the
 Development of Post-Thatcherite Conservatism” Peter Dorey (Cardiff
 University, Cardiff)
 “‘A Crusade to Enfranchise the Many’: Thatcher and the ‘Property-
 Owning Democracy’” Matthew Francis (University of Nottingham,
 Nottingham)
- 12:00–13:00 *Lunch Break*

13:00–15:00 *Session 3 (Chair: Jonathan Terra)* (room – 021)

“Conservatism and Postcolonial Politics” Stefan Andreasson (Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast)

“The Meaning of a Concept: (Neo) Conservatism” Levente Nagy (University of Debrecen, Hungary)

“Challenging the Conservative Exceptionalism” Dogancan Ozsel (Anglo-American University, Prague)

Session 4 (Chair: Agnès Alexandre-Collier) (room – 022)

“Immigration as a Source of Ideological Tension for the Swedish Centre-Right” Pontus Odmalm (University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh)

“Justice and Development Party's Discourse of Democracy and Conservatism” Ulku Doganay (Ankara University, Ankara)

“Cyprus Issue and the Conservative Attitudes of the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots” Bulent Evre (Near East University, Nicosia)

15:00–15:15 *Coffee Break*

15:15–17:55 *Session 5 (Chair: Stefan Andreasson)* (room – 002)

“Legislation of Morality and the Delvin-Hart Debate” Bill Miller (Anglo-American University, Prague)

“The Authority of Morality over Politics—the Conservative Position” Zoltan Balazs (Corvinus University, Budapest)

“The Cultural Prerequisites of Social Cohesion” Kasper Støvring (University of Southern Denmark, Odense)

“Conservatism and a European Cultural Reconstruction” Alicja Gescinska (University of Ghent, Ghent)

18:10–21:00 *Conference Dinner*

Day Two (May 15)

8:45–9:45 *Keynote Speech:* (room – 002)

“Conservatism and Anthropology: Arnold Gehlen and the German Labyrinth” Hilal Onur Ince (University of Hacettepe, Ankara)

9:45–10:00 *Coffee Break*

10:00–12:00 *Session 6 (Chair: Hrishabh Sandilya)* (room – 021)

“Turk-Islam Synthesis: A Conservatisation Project in Turkey” Erhan Akarcay (Anadolu University, Eskisehir)

“Contemporary Serbian Conservatism: Between Incoherence and Apologetic Tendencies” Rastislav Dinic (Central European University, Budapest)

“‘Patrician’ Conservatism in Hungary” Gergely Egedy (Corvinus University, Budapest)

Session 7 (Chair: Levente Nagy) (room – 022)

“Turkish Conservative Thought: A General Framework” Mehmet Akinci (University of Aksaray, Aksaray), Hilal Onur Ince (University of Hacettepe, Ankara)

“The ‘Conservative Revolution’ in Saudi Arabia” Nani Gelovani (Tbilisi State University, Tbilisi)

“Abdullah Badawi and Malaysian Politics After Mahathir” Muhamad Takiyuddin Ismail (National University of Malaysia, Bangi Selangor)

12:00–13:00 Lunch Break

13:00–15:00 Open Discussion and Follow-up (room – 002)

PLEASE, NOTE:

The sessions will take place at the Anglo-American University campus at Lázeňská 2: sessions 1, 3 and 7 in room 021; sessions 2, 4 and 6 in room 022.

Registration and the opening speech and the first keynote speech will take place at Lázeňská 4, room 001.

The Session 5 and the second keynote speech will take place in room 002.

At the end of Day One confirmed guests and speakers are invited to the conference dinner at the nearby El Centro restaurant, Maltézské náměstí 9. RSVP to make a reservation.